Experts discuss nuclear deterrence in Europe: more weapons, more security?
On 22 January, a panel of international experts on nuclear deterrence gathered at the Campus The Hague to discuss the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. The panel addressed key aspects of nuclear strategy and the impact of Russia's nuclear rhetoric in the context of the war in Ukraine.
As Europe faces growing security challenges, the experts emphasised that nuclear deterrence strategies must evolve to remain credible. Expanding collaboration, fostering public engagement, and carefully navigating Russia's nuclear rhetoric are essential, the panel concluded.
This event was part of a series of three organised by ISGA in collaboration with the Security Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focused on deterrence in Europe ahead of the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague. Each event includes a day of discussions among European experts, followed by a public panel discussion.
The experts spoke in a personal capacity and made clear that their views did not necessarily reflect those of their employers or countries.
The credibility of european nuclear deterrence
David Blagden, Associate Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Exeter, discussed the current credibility of European nuclear deterrence. He stated that 'the current European nuclear capabilities are adequate, given their survivability and high readiness, especially with U.S. involvement, but even without it.'
Blagden pointed out that Europe, with the nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom and their technologically advanced nuclear submarines, possesses the ability for a so-called 'secure second strike.' This means that a hostile attack can be responded to, even if one's own country is struck first. This enhances the deterrent effect by reducing the incentive for escalation.
However, Blagden warned that Europe must consider scenarios where U.S. involvement significantly diminishes and that fundamental shifts in U.S. perspectives on European defence may arise.
Can successful deterrence be proven?
Professor François Heisbourg, Senior Adviser for Europe at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Special Adviser to the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, argued that it is virtually impossible to prove that deterrence has worked. Philosophically, this is comparable to proving an absence.
Heisbourg noted that deterrence was not effective in preventing the war in Ukraine, despite the threat of economic sanctions. This illustrates that certain forms of deterrence, such as nuclear or economic threats, are not always successful.
The Reemergence of Russian nuclear threats since 2014
Artur Kacprzyk, an analyst with the International Security Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, examined the impact of Russia’s renewed focus on nuclear weapons since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine.
He observed that while Russian nuclear threats have become more severe since the invasion of Ukraine, they have not been as effective as Moscow might have hoped. 'These threats have not prevented Western support for Ukraine,' he said, 'but they have caused delays in the delivery of certain weapons.'
The fear of escalation slowed the provision of crucial equipment, affecting Ukraine’s ability to push back against Russian attacks in the second half of 2022. Furthermore, Kacprzyk warned that NATO must be prepared to respond to further Russian aggression and should think carefully about long-term nuclear deterrence strategies.
Public understanding: a missing link in deterrence
Barbara Kunz, Senior Researcher and Director of the European Security Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, stressed that discussions on deterrence often focus too heavily on the quantity of weapons. 'Many debates are based on the assumption that more weapons equal more deterrence and thus more security,' she argued.
Kunz cautioned, however, that possessing weapons alone is not sufficient. What is truly needed are strategic plans, clear policies, and solid intelligence to effectively identify targets. The focus should not only be on military capabilities but also on the structures, logistics, and execution required to make deterrence genuinely effective.
Opportunities for European cooperation
Alexander Mattelaer, Associate Professor of International Security at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance, warned against unrealistic expectations regarding European alternatives to the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. to its allies. 'NATO’s deterrence strategy fundamentally relies on the United States' strategic nuclear forces,' he stated.
Mattelaer emphasised that a credible European nuclear deterrence capability without the U.S. would require enormous investments, significant time, and complex political agreements. He therefore called for appreciating and strengthening existing NATO structures. This includes expanding conventional military forces and enhancing the possibilities of nuclear sharing, such as involving more allies and introducing new delivery systems.
According to Mattelaer, the key factor ultimately remains political determination. 'It is about our willingness to stand up for each other when an ally is threatened.'
Text: Niels Heukelom
Pictures: Arash Nikkhah