Interview Tom Theuns in IQ Magazine: “NATO Resembles a House of Cards”
The rise of authoritarianism, the strengthening of the radical right, and the role of the EU in defending democracy—these are just a few of the issues causing concern today. Is the EU capable of defending democratic values within the Union and beyond its borders? In an interview from the Lithuanian IQ Magazine, analyst Agnė Piepaliūtė spoke about these topics with Tom Theuns, Senior Assistant Professor of Political Theory and European Politics at the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, as well as an Associate Researcher at the Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po University in Paris.
You recently published the book “Protecting Democracy in Europe: Pluralism, Autocracy, and the Future of the EU.” From what do we need to protect democracy in Europe?
The book’s title emphasizes the protection of democracy in Europe—not only in terms of preserving the democratic nature of EU member states but also safeguarding democracy within the EU itself: its policies, institutions, decision-making, and legislative processes. So, what are we protecting it from? From the rise of authoritarianism, from anti-democratic policies. At present, at least one EU member state (Hungary – IQ note) can no longer be considered democratic. We must also defend democracy from political parties and actors, both within and outside the EU, who seek to undermine liberal democracy and its foundations.
When does democracy cease to be democracy?
Democracy in Europe is a complex concept. According to Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union, the governments of EU member states must be democratically accountable to their parliaments or citizens. This is the reason why we can expect them to be democratic.
At the European level, these governments are mandated to represent their citizens—democratic nations. They do so in the European Council, where heads of state and government leaders gather, as well as in the Council of the EU, where ministers make decisions on various policy areas. They also nominate members of the European Commission (EC) and candidates for the European Court of Justice when vacancies arise. All these processes rely on the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national governments.
However, the question of the EU’s own democratic nature also arises. This is not an easily understood concept because the EU is not a direct democratic entity. It has certain legislative
powers that must adhere to democratic principles, but it does not function like a conventional democratic state. In other words, while the EU possesses some democratic characteristics, it is not, in itself, a democracy. But these democratic characteristics erode if certain member states, political parties, or actors within the EU undermine the foundations of liberal democracy.
The European Parliament is the most democratic EU institution since its members are elected in all member states. However, if the electoral conditions in a given country become insufficiently pluralistic, the quality of democracy declines. This can happen when a government turns state media into a propaganda tool, suppresses media diversity by buying up newspapers or television channels, and so on. If such processes reach a point where free and fair elections become impossible, then the legitimacy of MEPs elected from such countries becomes questionable, as they were elected in unfair elections.
In one of your articles, you criticize the European Commission (EC) for promoting “democracy without politics.” Could you explain what you mean by this?
The concept of “democracy without politics” emerged from research I conducted together with Spanish political scientist Alvaro Oleart. In this study, we analyzed a large number of speeches given by EC members over a considerable period—we reviewed hundreds of statements in which the words “democracy” or “democratic” were used. Our goal was to understand how EC members perceive democracy and in what context they discuss it.
Initially, we hypothesized—something that concerned us—that this discourse might significantly diverge from how democracy is understood in political science. In academic discussions, democracy is primarily associated with fundamental elements such as free and fair elections, freedom of speech and the press, equal civil and political rights, party pluralism, and political competition. Our study revealed that EC members rarely mentioned these aspects in their speeches. They spoke very little about elections, parliaments, or party competition. The role of the opposition was also scarcely mentioned. Instead, their focus was largely on the rule of law, human rights, and the quality of information—highlighting, for instance, that disinformation harms democracy.
Of course, these are important aspects of democracy, and none of the EC members made false or absurd statements. However, it became evident that their understanding of democracy was quite narrow—it largely ignored the core political elements of democracy, such as electoral competition and ideological rivalry. This is precisely why we labeled this phenomenon as “democracy without politics”—a way of discussing democracy as if political competition, ideological debates, and democratic contestation did not exist.
Analyzing this trend was important to us because it helps us understand why the EC’s response to democratic backsliding in some EU member states has been so limited—overly legalistic and technocratic. The EC primarily focuses on law and human rights while neglecting how authoritarian actors directly weaken political pluralism and democratic institutions. I also explore this issue in my book, where I analyze other collections of political speeches. This approach helps us understand why the crisis of democracy in EU member states does not always receive an adequate political response.
There is much discussion about a clear shift in European politics toward the far right. The recent German elections (the interview took place on February 25 – IQ note) also reflect this trend. Why are we seeing this tendency?
The rise of the radical right in European politics has been a topic of discussion for a long time. This theme resurfaces in every election cycle. In this particular case, we see a clear shift to the right: the radical right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) nearly doubled its results in the elections and secured a significant number of seats in the Bundestag. This is a new situation for German politics. However, in a way, we could say that Germany’s domestic politics is simply catching up with broader European trends. In many EU member states, radical right-wing parties have been performing better for some time than AfD did in these recent elections.
For example, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is often considered the first far-right party to enter the government of an EU member state. After the 1999 Austrian parliamentary elections, it formed a coalition with the center-right party in February 2000. This happened 25 years ago, showing that the strengthening of radical right-wing forces in Europe has been a slow but continuous process for a long time. Of course, this trend is not uniform—different countries experience both rises and declines.
For instance, in the Netherlands, we now have a coalition government that, for the first time, includes the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV). However, it is easy to forget that not long ago, there was a government that already had PVV’s support, even though it was not officially part of the coalition. So, this is not an entirely new phenomenon but rather a recurring pattern in politics. In some countries, we have yet to see this wave subside—the far right is still gaining strength. For example, in France, the National Rally has been steadily growing in influence and is currently stronger than ever. In Austria, FPÖ is now at one of its highest points, though there were periods between its strong election results in 1999 and the latest ones in 2024 when the party lost support.
So, this is not a simple or uniform story. But over a longer period, we do see that radical and far-right parties are increasingly cementing their place in European politics. This trend also aligns with a broader global phenomenon—in recent years, we have seen the rise of far-right leaders in Brazil, Argentina, the U.S., India, Turkey, Israel, and other countries. It appears to be a global moment. However, the key question remains—are we witnessing the beginning of a long-term trend, or are we approaching the peak of this phenomenon? Right now, it is very difficult to say.
What drives voters to choose populist and extremist politicians?
There are various theories explaining what motivates people to vote for the radical right or far-right populists, as well as for the radical left and left-wing populism. However, in my opinion, the most interesting shift is happening not within this left-right dichotomy but in a broader context. Moreover, it is likely that the motivations of right-wing and left-wing voters differ.
When discussing votes for the radical right and populist movements, several key theories emerge. One theory emphasizes cultural factors—people feel left behind in a globalized, cosmopolitan world that, in their view, does not benefit them. Another theory highlights economic aspects. Although the global economy has grown over the past decades, many countries have experienced increasing inequality and greater social insecurity. This is particularly evident in the decline of social protections and the weakening of labour rights compared to 20th-century norms. Such changes may be one reason why people turn to radical right-wing populist parties.
Another perspective, which is closer to political psychology, suggests that there is always a segment of society that tends to have a closed mindset—they are suspicious of “different” people and seek to protect themselves from them. This is sometimes referred to as authoritarian tendencies or an authoritarian personality. For a long time after World War II, such attitudes—such as openly expressed xenophobia or hostility toward immigrants—were considered taboo. However, in recent years, this taboo has been eroding, and the electoral success of radical right-wing parties increasingly aligns with the segment of society that exhibits authoritarian thinking.
Of course, as a political theorist this is not my primary area of research—I can discuss and teach about it, but I do not conduct causal studies on this phenomenon myself. Therefore, I cannot definitively say which of these theories is the most accurate, though I certainly have my own opinion. However, to reach final conclusions, more extensive empirical research would be needed.
Regarding France, what does the strengthening of Marine Le Pen and her movement mean for the country?
France, like Germany, is a central pillar of European cooperation. Support for Marine Le Pen and her National Rally has been significantly higher for some time than, for example, the recent results of AfD in Germany. At this moment, The National Rally is just a step away from executive power in France—both in parliamentary and presidential elections. One possibility is that The National Rally eventually forms the executive government in France. This would be the result of its long-term “de-demonization” strategy. Marine Le Pen has been working for years to distance her party from its radical origins and present a more acceptable, less extremist image. Some left-wing politicians in France argue that The National Rally is still the same party as The National Front (founded by Marine Le Pen’s father). However, it is evident that at least the party’s rhetoric and image have changed. It no longer engages in the kind of radical provocations seen in the past, and its leaders carefully avoid associations with neo-fascist roots.
However, this does not mean that extremist and anti- democratic views have completely disappeared from the party’s ideology. On a local level, away from the national political spotlight, the party still flirts with these themes. Additionally, part of its electorate supports it precisely because they expect hardline, radical policies. The National Rally also maintains strong ties with other far-right parties across Europe and the world.
An interesting example of this “de-demonization” process is a recent decision by party figure Jordan Bardella (widely considered the future prime minister if Marine Le Pen wins the presidency – IQ note). He cancelled his participation in CPAC, the largest gathering of conservative political forces in the U.S., after Steve Bannon (former advisor to Donald Trump – IQ note) performed a Nazi salute at the event. This cancellation was a symbolic gesture, signalling that the party seeks to distance itself from extreme elements. Whether Bardella was personally offended by the gesture is not the main issue—what matters is the message sent to French voters: the party wants to appear more “manageable” and suitable for executive power.
A similar strategy can be observed in Italy with Giorgia Meloni and her party, Brothers of Italy. While Meloni comes from neo-fascist political circles, she is now working to create a more acceptable image for both herself and her movement.
This reflects a broader trend across Europe—radical right-wing parties are adapting and integrating into the political mainstream. They are not abandoning their core ideology but are presenting it in a more palatable form.
It seems that since becoming prime minister, Giorgia Meloni has softened her rhetoric considerably. What happened during the election campaign is quite different from what we see now.
That is exactly the impression she aims to create. However, to some extent, this masks certain domestic political processes that remain closely aligned with far-right ideology. There are also symbols and elements that she does not attempt to distance herself from.
For example, Marine Le Pen has gone to great lengths to rid her party of its extremist origins—she changed the party’s name, removed her father from the honorary president position, and has consistently worked on reshaping its image. In Giorgia Meloni’s case, the changes are not as pronounced.
Her party, Brothers of Italy, still retains the tricolon flame in its logo—a clear reference to the party’s neo-fascist roots. This indicates that while her public rhetoric has become more moderate, certain historical and ideological elements remain unchanged.
So, would you say that Marine Le Pen is less extreme than Giorgia Meloni?
Marine Le Pen has consciously pursued a softer, less radical version of her party as an electoral strategy to gain broader voter support—even more so than Giorgia Meloni. The key difference between them is that Meloni toned down her rhetoric primarily after being elected, as she engaged with other world leaders and adapted to the European political cooperation framework. In contrast, for Le Pen, this stylistic moderation has been a deliberate and long-term electoral strategy aimed at winning elections.
In this regard, we can observe not only the difference between Meloni and Le Pen but also the contrast between them and populist politicians such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, or Javier Milei. In the latter cases, their electoral strategy relies not on moderation but on radicalization—their rhetoric deliberately becomes sharper to mobilize their voter base. The open question remains do they soften their positions after elections? We have seen some shifts in all three of these cases, but softening is not a universal rule.
If Marine Le Pen wins the election, what would it mean for the rest of Europe?
In the case of France, the worst realistic scenario is that Marine Le Pen wins the presidential election. However, I do not believe that The National Rally would be able to win or even form a majority in parliament. France’s electoral system is structured in two rounds—there is a separate vote for the executive branch in presidential elections, while parliamentary elections are highly fragmented, with separate contests in each district.
Aside from Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen currently enjoys perhaps the highest political recognition in France. Increasingly, people either accept the idea that she could become president or are indifferent to the question of whether she would actually be worse than the alternatives. This gives her a genuine chance of securing the highest office in the country—perhaps not a 50/50 probability, but still a serious possibility.
Still, France’s parliamentary election system is not favourable to her. France’s electoral system is more similar to that of the United Kingdom than to the Netherlands— in that it operates through individual contests in each district; furthermore, in France multiple candidates advance to the second round. To win, it is not enough to make it to the final vote;securing a majority in the second round is necessary.
In the past elections, we have already seen that political forces were able to coordinate their efforts against The National Rally—especially left-wing and centrist parties. It is likely that such strategic coalitions will continue, as there is still a significant portion of voters who strongly oppose Marine Le Pen.
In a two-round system like this, such alliances are crucial—unlike in the Netherlands, where a single-round proportional system makes it easier for extreme parties to gain representation. For this reason, I do not believe that National Rally will dominate a French government anytime soon.
Regarding Germany, the recent elections seemed almost accidental. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht) missed the 5% threshold by just 0.03%, which ultimately allowed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to have a chance at forming a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) . While this is a very fragile majority, it provides a degree of stability compared to a three-party coalition.
However, Chancellor Olaf Scholz was significantly weakened in the eyes of voters, meaning that coalition negotiations will be difficult. CDU leader Friedrich Merz takes a tougher stance on security issues than Scholz—at least in rhetoric. If he takes over leadership, as is expected, Germany’s foreign policy could become more assertive.
That said, I don’t believe Europe is heading into a period of greater chaos than what we have already experienced in the past five or six years. If we were to pinpoint a truly critical moment, it likely already occurred a few years ago—while the situation remains complex, it is at least stable.
You study EU foreign policy. Critics often argue that the EU’s external promotion of democracy can sometimes resemble neocolonialism or paternalism. How do you view this?
Yes, such criticism exists, and I have always had a dual perspective on this argument.
On the one hand, there is a form of democracy promotion rooted in the neoconservative politics of the United States— this is a rather aggressive model, often involving even the use of military force. Such a policy can indeed have imperialist or neo-colonialist undertones.
On the other hand, to claim that any effort to promote democracy, human rights, or the rule of law is inherently colonialist or paternalistic seems rather strange to me. This argument is typically framed as follows: let’s say there is a country—China, for example—and another country, say Norway, which, in its relations with China, tries to promote governance reforms, human rights protection, and the strengthening of democracy whenever possible. Critics might say: “This is paternalistic. China wants to govern itself differently, it does not want the Western democratic model.”
But who exactly is this “we” that supposedly does not want democracy? If it refers to the authoritarian elite that opposes democracy because it would mean a loss of power for them, then I do not consider democracy promotion to be paternalism. Telling an authoritarian regime that it should not oppress its people is not colonialism.
If “we” refers to the Chinese society itself—what some call the “democratic Chinese nation”—then this argument contradicts itself. To claim that a democratic society has democratically decided to reject democracy is paradoxical. If this were true, it would mean that it already has democratic procedures in place to make such a decision. But the very principle of democracy is to continuously provide people with the opportunity to express their will regarding how they want to be governed.
Of course, there can be thousands of models of democracy in the world. There is no single perfect democratic standard that Western Europe created and that everyone should follow. However, arguments that attempt to use democratic principles to justify anti-democratic decisions seem weak and contradictory to me—they undermine themselves.
How do you assess the EU’s current promotion of democracy in today’s geopolitical context? There is even the term “Brussels effect”—do you think it will still be effective?
I believe that the EU has never been particularly successful in promoting democracy, and I certainly do not expect this to change. I see no reason to believe that the EU will become more effective in this area in the future.
However, in certain situations, the EU has been quite successful in promoting a rules-based order. I emphasize this deliberately because that is precisely what the book you mentioned about the “Brussels Effect” discusses—not genuine democratic governance, but a system based on rules. Of course, this is not insignificant, especially if the alternative is a system where rules do not exist or are applied chaotically.
For many people, this can represent a significant improvement in their lives—if corruption decreases, if rules are applied equally to everyone, if different stakeholders have a greater opportunity to contribute to the creation of those rules. Even if this is not a democratic process where every citizen can freely vote, it can still be seen as a form of progress. But it is not democracy.
One of the biggest shortcomings of the EU’s democracy promotion is the confusion between a rules-based order and democracy—both in academic and political circles. For example, if the EU funds forums where Casablanca residents can express their opinions to the Moroccan government about the quality of drinking water supply, this can be a useful tool for policymaking. However, it would be incorrect to call this a democratic process. Such inclusion can be a positive change, but it does not grant people direct power—the essence of which is free and fair elections and a real ability for citizens to change their government.
While the EU can exert influence by developing a rules-based order, its ability to promote true democracy is limited, and in my opinion, this will not change in the near future.
What do you see as the main challenges for the EU in the coming months?
In the coming months, the EU’s primary challenge will remain security—how to navigate a situation where the U.S. is increasingly withdrawing from Europe’s collective defence system.
I believe that NATO currently resembles a house of cards—it is a highly fragile structure. I doubt that the current U.S. administration would uphold the Alliance’s commitments and defend another NATO member if it were attacked, at least in many realistic scenarios. Because of this, NATO, while still a useful organization, is becoming increasingly unreliable as Europe’s security guarantor.
Therefore, the EU urgently needs to rethink its security strategy on a European level—how European countries can strengthen their military independence from NATO, the U.S., and the broader transatlantic partnership, which increasingly feels like a relic of the late 20th century. Europe must ensure its geopolitical and military credibility both in the face of direct threats from Russia and in the context of long-term hybrid conflicts. This is not just a long-term issue but an urgent matter that the EU must address now.
Writer: Agnė Piepaliūtė. Source: IQ Magazine.